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The Dormant Commerce Clause As a
Limit on Personal Jurisdiction
John F. Preis
ABSTRACT: For over 70 years, the Due Process Clause has defined the law of
personal jurisdiction. This makes sense, because being forced to stand trial in a
far-off state will sometimes be fundamentally unfair. What does not make sense,
however, is the Dormant Commerce Clause’s apparent irrelevance to personal
jurisdiction. The Dormant Commerce Clause addresses state laws affecting
interstate commerce, and a plaintiff’s choice of forum is often a commercially
driven choice between different state courts. So why isn’t the Dormant Commerce
Clause part of personal jurisdiction doctrine?
This Article makes the case for its relevance, and demonstrates how the Dormant
Commerce Clause can resolve a new and vexing personal jurisdiction issue. Since
the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman—a personal
jurisdiction case that significantly curtailed options for forum shoppers—
plaintiffs across the country have been attempting to establish jurisdiction using
a company’s registration to do business in a state, even when the suit has nothing
to do with the company’s business there. Focusing solely on the Due Process Clause,
courts across the country have split on the issue. The Dormant Commerce Clause,
however, presents a clear answer.
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of how the Dormant Commerce
Clause impacts personal jurisdiction. It argues that jurisdiction based on a
company’s registration to do business violates the Dormant Commerce Clause—
but only in cases where the lawsuit has no connection to the forum. It also
demonstrates how personal jurisdiction comports with the Dormant Commerce
Clause in most situations deemed constitutional under the Due Process Clause.
In certain general jurisdiction cases (to the extent any remain after Daimler) and
transient jurisdiction cases, however, this Article argues that the Dormant
Commerce Clause renders personal jurisdiction unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION

Have you ever been to a “judicial hellhole?”1 It is a place where judges
hate summary judgment, and juries love to give money to old ladies burned
by hot coffee. Or at least that is what the defense bar will tell you. The
plaintiffs’ bar will tell you that these dens of iniquity are actually safe havens—
places where the little guy can fight a big corporation that forgot to put a
safety shield in front of a spinning blade. Whether hellhole or haven, there is
one issue that both sides can agree on: forum matters.
Because forum matters, plaintiffs understandably search for the most
advantageous forum in which to bring their suit. A major factor in forum
selection is the law of personal jurisdiction, a body of law based in large part
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.2 The Due Process
Clause means many things, but at a minimum, it guarantees litigants the
freedom from random or irregular adjudication.3 In the context of personal
jurisdiction, this means that defendants may not be hauled into court in a faroff state simply because a plaintiff has chosen to sue them there. In the
Supreme Court’s opinion, a judicial system in which a plaintiff has unfettered
discretion to file suit in dozens of different states, many of them thousands of
miles away, is not an orderly system of law.4
Even though the Due Process Clause is an essential component of
personal jurisdiction law, it is odd that it seems to be the only component. To
the extent that a state’s personal jurisdiction law discourages companies from
doing business in a state (and thus subjecting themselves to jurisdiction
there), the Dormant Commerce Clause—which renders unconstitutional
state laws that discourage outsiders from engaging in commerce in a
particular state—should have much to say about personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, in the first part of the 20th century, courts routinely applied the
Dormant Commerce Clause to limit state assertions of personal jurisdiction.5
After standing in the background for so long, it is high time for the
Dormant Commerce Clause to step forward. In recent years, the Supreme

1.
For a list of the leading “hellholes,” see JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhell
holes.org (last visited September 16, 2016).
2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3.
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a court’s
assertion of authority over a party must comport with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
4.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (explaining that
the Due Process Clause “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”).
5.
See, e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, 287 (1932); Michigan
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 495 (1929); Davis v. Farmers’ Co-Op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312,
315 (1923); Panstwowe Zaklady Graviozne v. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.2d 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
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Court has issued a spate of major personal jurisdiction decisions.6 These
decisions have set off a wave of commentary in the legal academy,7 but the
questions raised by these new cases are not simply academic. At present, jurists
across the country are wrestling with a new and vexing issue of personal
jurisdiction: whether a company’s registration to do business in a state
amounts to consent to personal jurisdiction in that state.8 What no scholar or
jurist has recognized, however, is that the Dormant Commerce Clause clarifies
modern personal jurisdiction law in a way that the Due Process Clause, on its
own, cannot.
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis9 of how the Dormant
Commerce Clause restricts state courts’ assertion of personal jurisdiction.10
Part II provides an overview of personal jurisdiction law and a summary of the
current debate over whether registration to do business can, on its own,
support personal jurisdiction. Part III explores the dictates of the Dormant
6.
See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121–22 (2014) (holding that a defendant must
purposefully establish contacts with the forum state itself, not simply with a plaintiff who is a
domiciliary of the forum state); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014) (holding that
general jurisdiction is unavailable in a state if such jurisdiction would “presumably be available in
every other State in which [the defendant’s] sales are sizable”); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (holding that general jurisdiction only exists where
“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially
at home in the forum State” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (holding that placing an item into the “stream of commerce,” without
more, does not subject a defendant to jurisdiction in a state).
7.
See generally, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Local Effects of Intentional
Misconduct, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (2015); Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction,
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245 (2014); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and
the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343 (2015); John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal
Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607 (2015); Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 387 (2012); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207 (2014); Stephen E. Sachs, How
Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301 (2014); Kevin D. Benish, Note,
Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman,
90 NYU L. REV. 1609 (2015); George Rutherglen, Reconceiving Personal Jurisdiction: Sovereignty,
Authority, and Individual Rights (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13,
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564300.
8.
Compare Senju Pharm. Co. v. Metrics, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 428, 440–43 (D.N.J. 2015)
(holding that a company’s registration to do business in a state signifies the company’s consent
to jurisdiction for any and all claims), with Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390, 397–400 (D.
Conn. 2014) (holding registration to do business in a state insufficient, on its own, to support
personal jurisdiction). See also infra notes 46–50.
9.
Scholars have periodically considered whether the Dormant Commerce Clause should
play a role in personal jurisdiction. See infra note 61 (collecting sources). No scholar, however,
has performed a full-scale analysis of the issue.
10.
This Article only addresses personal jurisdiction in state courts. Federal courts, which are not
bound by the Dormant Commerce Clause, would not be constitutionally bound to adhere to this
Article’s conclusions. Nonetheless, to the extent federal courts are statutorily required to obey the
personal jurisdiction doctrine of state courts, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)–(B), the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s limitations on personal jurisdiction would also apply in federal court.
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Commerce Clause and how they resolve the registration question. It argues
that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state from subjecting a
defendant to jurisdiction based on registration, but only where the lawsuit
lacks any connection to the forum state. Personal jurisdiction is
unconstitutional in these situations because it impermissibly discriminates
against interstate commerce11 and imposes an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce.12 Registration laws discourage out-of-state companies
from doing business in a particular state. This disincentive has the effect of
protecting local businesses from outside competition—a phenomenon
prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause unless the state has a sufficient
local interest. Where the plaintiff resides in the forum state or the injury was
suffered there, the state interest is significant enough to overcome the adverse
effects on commerce. In contrast, where a nonresident is injured out of
state—i.e., the plaintiff is a true forum shopper—the state interest is
insufficient, and allowing jurisdiction in such situations violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Part IV assesses the constitutionality of other accepted
grounds for personal jurisdiction, concluding that personal jurisdiction based
on domicile, minimum contacts, and other forms of consent are all
constitutional. There are, however, two grounds for jurisdiction that are
suspect. First, personal jurisdiction based on a company’s extensive contacts
with a state (to the extent such jurisdiction is still available13) is likely
unconstitutional if invoked by a nonresident who suffered an injury out of
state. Second, transient jurisdiction (jurisdiction based only on service of
process) is likely unconstitutional in a narrow class of cases.14
In the end, this Article reinforces and partly modifies our judicial
system’s general disapproval of the boldest forms of forum shopping. Forum
shopping is not per se wrong, and plaintiffs generally have wide latitude to

11.
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472–76 (2005) (holding state tax
unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate commerce was not serving a
legitimate state purpose in a narrowly tailored manner). For a description of the discrimination
test under the Dormant Commerce Clause, see BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.05 (2016).
12.
See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959) (holding state law
unconstitutional because it imposed a burden on interstate commerce that was not offset with a
local benefit). For a description of the burden test under the Dormant Commerce Clause, see
DENNING, supra note 11, § 6.06[A].
13.
As explained in Part I, Daimler AG v. Bauman significantly narrowed the scope of general
jurisdiction. It is clear, however, that such jurisdiction will still exist in “exceptional” cases.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.19 (2014).
14.
Such cases are those in which a plaintiff seeks transient jurisdiction over a defendant
who is: (1) a natural person; (2) in a state in which neither the plaintiff nor defendant reside and
which the defendant’s activities did not give rise to the plaintiff’s harm; and (3) in a state in which
the defendant is plausibly present for the purpose of engaging in interstate commerce. See infra
notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
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choose the most advantageous forum possible.15 Where the chosen forum
lacks any connection with the lawsuit, however, our legal system has generally
concluded that the fundamental fairness prohibits jurisdiction. The Due
Process Clause has been used to achieve this result, but it sometimes falls short
of the task. In these situations, the Dormant Commerce Clause can be used
to ferret out impermissible forms of forum shopping. The result, on the
whole, is a sturdier and more coherent body of law dealing with forum
selection.
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE NEW DEBATE OVER JURISDICTION-VIAREGISTRATION

To see how the Dormant Commerce Clause impacts personal jurisdiction
law, the first step is to lay out the contours of personal jurisdiction law itself.
Subpart A outlines the contours of contemporary personal jurisdiction law,
paying particular heed to Daimler AG v. Bauman—a recent Supreme Court
case that significantly curtailed plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Subpart B explores
the judicial and scholarly responses to a question that has arisen in the wake
of Daimler—whether a company’s registration to do business in a state subjects
it to personal jurisdiction, even where the claim does not arise from the
company’s activities in that state.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, BEFORE AND AFTER DAIMLER
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause establishes a right to
be free from random justice. Random justice is justice by a roll of the dice or
a spin of the wheel. Just as it would be ridiculous to determine guilt or
innocence by chance, it would similarly be ridiculous to allow a plaintiff to
spin a roulette wheel to send a case to Alaska involving a Florida car accident
between two Florida residents. The law of personal jurisdiction—in the
Supreme Court’s view at least—gives our legal system a “degree of
predictability.”16 It allows “potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit.”17
The jurisdictions in which a defendant is most commonly sued are the
states where the defendant is domiciled18 and where the cause of action
arose.19 For a plaintiff intent on shopping for the ideal forum, this is not likely
to yield a very good selection because it will often mean that a defendant is

15.
See generally Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting
a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999); see also generally Mary Garvey Algero, Note, Forum Shopping
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990).
16.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
17.
Id.
18.
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
19.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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amenable to suit in only one state and very rarely more than three or four.20
Plaintiffs can sometimes add a state to this list by serving the defendant while
she is present in the plaintiff’s preferred forum state,21 but such “transient
jurisdiction” is almost certainly unavailable against the most attractive
defendants: corporations and other businesses.22
Until recently, plaintiffs suing large corporations had an additional and
powerful option: they could bring suit anywhere the corporation conducted
extensive business. For large companies, this could mean dozens of states
across the country (as well as the District of Columbia and U.S. territories).23
Often called “general jurisdiction”24 or “doing business jurisdiction,”25 the
doctrine permitted plaintiffs to sue a defendant in any state in which it
maintained “continuous and systematic general business contacts.”26 Plaintiffs
could sue large corporations doing business throughout America in the state
with the most plaintiff-friendly laws, regardless of where the cause of action
arose. All of this changed, however, on January 14, 2014.
On that day, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Daimler AG v.
Bauman.27 The issue in Daimler was whether Daimler—the German parent
company of Mercedes Benz USA—could be sued in California for harms

20. Natural persons have a single domicile and corporate defendants typically have no more
than two (the state of incorporation and state of the company’s principle place of business).
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011). Causes of action
usually arise in only a single state, but in some cases will touch multiple states. Thus, domicile and
cause of action together often produce only a single state where personal jurisdiction can be
established, and rarely more than three or four.
21.
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990).
22. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never definitively declared this to be the case.
Nonetheless, Supreme Court precedent implies this and commentators agree. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326
U.S. at 312, 320 (permitting personal jurisdiction where corporate agent was served with process in the
forum state, only because the corporations contacts with the state were significant enough); Carol Rice
Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1072 (2012)
(explaining that personal jurisdiction over a corporation based only on service of process is “almost
certainly is not a proper view”); Monestier, supra note 7, at 1374 (“Commentators are generally in
agreement that this presence-based rationale for general jurisdiction over corporations is not
justifiable.”); see also Monestier, supra note 7, at 1373 (discussing cases). Regarding other types of
business entities, the law appears less clear. At least one circuit, for example, permits transient
jurisdiction over partnerships. See First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 18 (2d Cir.
1998). The analysis depends on whether the defendant is a small or closely held entity rather than a
large entity with numerous agents capable of accepting service. With large entities, it is less likely that
the entity would be present in every state where one of its agents is present.
23.
See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
24.
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. The term “general jurisdiction” is thought to derive
from Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–44 (1966).
25.
See generally Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171.
26.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
27.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
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allegedly committed in Argentina to Argentinian nationals.28 Daimler could
not be subject to personal jurisdiction in California based on its residency,
service of process, or contacts with the state that gave rise to the alleged cause
of action, and there was no suggestion that Daimler somehow consented to
the court’s jurisdiction. The only way to sue Daimler in California, therefore,
was under the doctrine of general jurisdiction, if the company had engaged
in extensive business within the state.29
The plaintiffs had a pretty good argument for general jurisdiction.
California is practically teeming with shiny Mercedes cars. Indeed, as the
plaintiffs demonstrated, the state accounts for 10% of Daimler’s sales in the
United States, and 2.4% of its worldwide sales.30 If a plaintiff could sue
Walmart in California for any claim, why not Daimler? The answer, in a
surprise ruling from the Court, is that plaintiffs cannot sue either company in
California using general jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs’ chief error, according to the Court, was assuming that a
corporation that maintains “continuous and systematic” contacts with a state
is subject to general jurisdiction in that state.31 The appropriate test is not
simply whether the corporation’s contacts are continuous and systematic, but
whether they are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at
home in the forum State.”32 If “continuous and systematic” is divorced from the
“essentially at home” modifier, as the plaintiffs argued, then Daimler could
presumably be sued “in every other State in which [its] sales are sizeable.”33
Such nationwide jurisdiction is at odds, the Court explained, with a
fundamental purpose of personal jurisdiction law: to allow defendants “to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”34 The Court
acknowledged that there might be situations in which a corporation could be

28.
Id. at 751–52.
29.
As Daimler illustrates, the doctrine of general jurisdiction has been particularly attractive to
foreign plaintiffs suing companies with a significant presence in America. For further analysis of general
jurisdiction as it relates to international forum shopping, see Donald Earl Childress III, General
Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 67, 77–79 (2013), and
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 497 (2011).
30.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. The Court sidestepped the issue of whether these sales were
properly attributable to Daimler, given that it was only the parent company of Mercedes Benz
USA, the corporation that actually made the sales. The Court assumed for the purpose of
argument that the subsidiary’s “contacts are imputable to Daimler” but yet still found “no basis”
for subjecting “Daimler to general jurisdiction in California.” Id. at 760.
31.
Id. at 761.
32.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 762 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
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“essentially at home” in a state other than its state of incorporation or
headquarters.35 These situations, however, are “exceptional.”36
Since Daimler, lower courts have quickly concluded that nationwide
jurisdiction against large corporations is no longer available.37 Scholars have
likewise reached the same conclusion. As Professor Tanya Monestier
explained, “[w]hat [Daimler] means, in practical terms, is that plaintiffs
looking to sue corporate defendants will be severely circumscribed in their
choice of forums.”38
B. THE NEW FRONTIER OF JURISDICTION-VIA-REGISTRATION
When the Supreme Court shuts a door, clever litigants look for an open
window. When the Supreme Court shut the door on general jurisdiction in
Daimler, some plaintiffs found a window called “consent.” What follows is a
discussion of the consent arguments plaintiffs have been making, the judicial
and scholarly responses to those arguments, and finally, the potential
relevance of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
1. Arguing Consent After Daimler
The right to be free from jurisdiction in a particular state is a personal
constitutional right. Just as a defendant can waive his right to be free from a
police search by consenting to the search,39 he can also waive his right to be
free from jurisdiction by consenting to a court’s power over him.40 Defendants
typically consent to a court’s power by “agree[ing] in advance [via contract]
to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court,”41 or failing to “timely raise[] in
the answer or a responsive pleading” the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction.42 These types of consent are common enough, but they hardly
expand the plaintiff’s choice of forum. A contract with a choice-of-forum
35.
Id. at 749 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
36.
Id. at 761 n.19 (referring to Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952)).
37.
See, e.g., Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating
that, after Daimler, it will be “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other
than the place of incorporation or principal place of business”); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova
Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2888 (2014) (Daimler
makes it “clear that even a company’s ‘engage[ment] in a substantial, continuous, and systematic
course of business’ is alone insufficient to render it at home in a forum.” (quoting Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014))).
38.
Monestier, supra note 7, at 1346.
39.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459 (1938).
40.
Insurance Corp. of Ir., LTD. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual
right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”).
41.
Id. at 704.
42.
Id. Other, less common, types of consent include a stipulation of jurisdiction filed by a
defendant, an agreement to arbitrate in a given state and a voluntary use of certain procedures
in a court. See id. at 703–04.
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clause actually limits a plaintiff’s choice because it will almost always specify a
single state in which suit must brought, not a list of 20 or 30 states in which
suit may be brought. Similarly, a plaintiff can hardly shop for an advantageous
forum if the viability of a suit in a given forum is dependent on the defendant
overlooking the defense of personal jurisdiction and consenting.
Given these limitations, plaintiffs in the post-Daimler era have turned to
another form of consent: registration to do business in a state.43 “Every state
has a registration statute that requires corporations doing business in the state
to register with the state and appoint an agent for service of process,”44 which
means that corporations doing business throughout the country will have
registered in a large number of states. Indeed, lots of large corporations will
likely have registered to do business in every state and territory. According to
the jurisdiction-via-registration argument, corporations willingly accept the
possibility that they may be sued in any state where they have registered and
appointed an agent to receive process. This acceptance of suit applies not just
to suits arising from the corporation’s activities in the state, but to any suit in
which the corporation is a defendant—regardless of where or when it arises.
2. Judicial and Scholarly Assessments
The law pertaining to jurisdiction-via-registration is in its infancy, mainly
because it was rarely needed in the pre-Daimler world. Now that the substantial
business option is gone, courts have returned to their old cases on the topic
and begun to apply them anew.45 Courts were divided on the doctrine prior
to Daimler, and now that it has been revived, the split continues today.

43.
Monestier, supra note 7, at 1358 (“Now that plaintiffs will have a much harder time
establishing general jurisdiction over defendants in all but the most obvious of cases, a different
ground of jurisdiction will most certainly take center stage: that of corporate registration.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Benish, supra note 7, at 1621 (noting that after Daimler, “[c]ourts are
now looking to consent as a basis of general jurisdiction over foreign corporations” (footnote
omitted)); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 7, at 259–60 (“Given the constriction of general
jurisdiction in [Daimler], the natural next step for plaintiffs is to seek other grounds for general
jurisdiction, and the most obvious place to look . . . is in a state registration filing that designates
a corporate agent for service of process.”).
44.
Monestier, supra note 7, at 1363 (footnote omitted).
45.
See, e.g., Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“Not only does the mere act of registering an agent not create Learjet’s general business
presence in Texas, it also does not act as consent to be hauled into Texas courts on any dispute
with any party anywhere concerning any matter.”); Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“We need not decide whether authorization to do business in Pennsylvania is a
‘continuous and systematic’ contact with the Commonwealth . . . because such registration by a
foreign corporation carries with it consent to be sued in Pennsylvania courts.”); Knowlton v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We conclude that appointment of
an agent for service of process under [the Minnesota statute] gives consent to the jurisdiction of
Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state.
Such consent is a valid basis of personal jurisdiction, and resort to minimum-contacts or dueprocess analysis to justify . . . jurisdiction is unnecessary.”); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d
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On one side of the post-Daimler split are cases like Otsuka Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Mylan, Inc.46 In Otsuka, the court stated plainly: “it cannot be genuinely
disputed that consent, whether by registration or otherwise, remains a valid
basis for personal jurisdiction following International Shoe. . . .”47 On the other
side are cases like AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc.48 There, the court held
that, because registration statutes exist in “[a] large number of states,”
“compliance with such statutes . . . would [thus] expose companies . . . to suit
all over the country, a result specifically at odds with Daimler.”49 Numerous
other courts have addressed the issue, some holding that jurisdiction-viaregistration is permissible,50 and others holding to the contrary.51 There can
be little doubt that the issue will reach the U.S. Supreme Court within the
next several years.
Although courts are split about whether registration amounts to consent
for the purposes of personal jurisdiction, scholars are in general agreement
that registration should not be understood as consent. Some scholars argue
that registration is not a true and knowing consent, especially given that the
alleged consent would apply to “any and all disputes involving any and all
plaintiffs,” whether they arose before registration or decades after the date of

745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The principles of due process require a firmer foundation than mere
compliance with state domestication statutes.”).
46.
Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 467 (D.N.J. 2015).
47.
Id.
48.
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del. 2014).
49.
Id. at 556–57.
50.
See generally, e.g., Keeley v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488 (E.D.
Mo. July 1, 2015); Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., No. 8:14–CV–403, 2015 WL 1538088 (D. Neb. Apr.
7, 2015); Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Mylan Inc., No. 14–777–RGA, No. 14–820–RGA, 2015 WL
1246285 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2015); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS,
2015 WL 880599 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No.
14–935–LPS, 2015 WL 186833 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2015); Senju Pharm. v. Metrics, Inc., 96 F. Supp.
3d 428 (D.N.J. 2015); Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Invests. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717(PKC), 2014 WL
904650, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014); Hudson v. Int’l Paper Co. (In re Asbestos Litig.), No.
N14C–03–247 ASB, 2015 WL 5016493 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015); Hoffman v. McGraw-Hill
Fin., Inc., No. ESX–C–216–13, 2014 WL 7639158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 31, 2014); Bailen
v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 190318/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014).
51. Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390, 397 (D. Conn. 2014); see also Lanham v. Pilot
Travel Ctrs., LLC, No. 03:14–CV–01923–HZ, 2015 WL 5167268, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2015);
Cowart v. Various Defendants (In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI)), No. 875, 2014 WL
5394310, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014); Pub. Impact, LLC v. Bos. Consulting Grp., Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 3d 732, 738–40 (M.D.N.C. 2015); Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F.
Supp. 3d 97, 104–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122,
135 (2d Cir. 2014)); Shrum v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 3:14–CV–03135–CSB–DGB, 2014 WL
6888446, at *2, *7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2014); Sullivan v. Sony Music Entm’t, No. 14 CV 731, 2014
WL 5473142, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2014); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d, at 123 (Del.
2016); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1422–CC00457, 2015 WL 191118, at
*2–3 ( Mo. Cir. 2015); Chambers v. Weinstein, 997 N.Y.S.2d 668 (table), No. 157781/2013,
2014 WL 4276910, at *16, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2014); Gliklad v. Bank Hapoalim B.M., No.
155195/2014, 2014 WL 3899209, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2014).
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registration.52 Others argue that extracting consent in exchange for the right
to do business in a state is an “unconstitutional condition.”53 Under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a state may not take a state benefit
(doing business in the state) hostage and demand the forfeiture of a
constitutional right (the right to refuse to litigate in a particular forum) as
ransom.54
3. A Role for the Dormant Commerce Clause?
Although the judicial and scholarly responses to the jurisdiction-viaregistration issue are still developing, no one yet has considered whether this
type of consent might violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Before the
Supreme Court decided International Shoe v. Washington55 in 1945, the
Dormant Commerce Clause regularly figured into personal jurisdiction
questions. In the 1923 case of Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op, for example, the
Supreme Court considered whether a Kansas company that injured a Kansas
resident in Kansas could be sued in Minnesota because it was registered to do
business there.56 The Court held that Minnesota’s assertion of jurisdiction was
unconstitutional. The problem with jurisdiction was not the company’s lack
of contacts with the state or any inherent unfairness to the company, but
instead that the suit would require the company’s Kansas employees to be
“absen[t] . . . from their customary occupations,” thus placing a “heavy”
burden on interstate commerce.57 Davis was one of many cases in which state
and federal courts concluded that state assertions of personal jurisdiction will
sometimes offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.58 These pre-1945
decisions were somewhat crude, at least according to our modern approach

52.
Monestier, supra note 7, at 1384. For a similar view on why consent via registration is
impermissible, see Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1989),
and for a view on why corporate officers and directors do not consent to jurisdiction in the state
of incorporation, see generally Eric Chiappinelli, The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond
Nicastro, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 783 (2013).
53.
See Benish, supra note 7, at 1640–43; see also generally D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and Appointment of an Agent: An Unconstitutional Condition
Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1990).
54.
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
55.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56.
Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 314 (1923).
57.
Id. at 315.
58.
See, e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, 287 (1932); Mich.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 496 (1929); Atchison, Topeka & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Wells, 265
U.S. 101, 103 (1924); Panstwowe Zaklady Graviozne v. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F. 2d 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1928). For further cases on this issue, see R.T.K., Annotation, Assumption of Jurisdiction by Court as
Violation of Commerce Clause, 104 A.L.R. 1075 (1936).
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to the Dormant Commerce Clause,59 but they still focused on the central idea
animating that doctrine: states may not maintain laws that steer commerce
into or away from a particular state.
The Dormant Commerce Clause once played an important role in
personal jurisdiction, and it can do so again.60 In past decades, scholars have
periodically considered the issue,61 but no scholar has yet performed a fullscale analysis of whether the two bodies of law intersect anymore. This Article
now turns to that issue, starting with the question of whether jurisdiction-viaregistration is constitutional.
III.

JURISDICTION-VIA-REGISTRATION AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

This Part brings the Dormant Commerce Clause to bear on the emerging
question of jurisdiction-via-registration. It argues that a state’s assertion of
jurisdiction based solely on a company’s registration to do business is
unconstitutional where the suit lacks any connection to the forum state, i.e.,
the plaintiff is a non-resident injured out of state. In other words, the Dormant
Commerce Clause should bar jurisdiction when it is sought by the true forum
shopper—the plaintiff who has selected a forum that has no relevance to the
suit, save its comparative likelihood to favor the plaintiff.

59.
At this time, the Supreme had yet to develop the two tests currently used in Dormant
Commerce Clause cases, the discrimination test and the Pike balancing test. For a discussion of
these tests, see infra notes 83–95, 122–50 and accompanying text.
60.
It is unclear why the Supreme Court turned away from the Dormant Commerce Clause
in evaluating personal jurisdiction. The best explanation is probably that the Court, faced with
personal jurisdiction cases involving increasingly complex interstate contacts, believed the
flexibility of the Due Process Clause allowed it to better manage personal jurisdiction doctrine.
After the Court decided International Shoe v. Washington, one sees the Dormant Commerce Clause
virtually disappear from the analysis. Interestingly, in May 2016, a district court held—for the first
time in many decades—that jurisdiction-via-registration violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
See McDonald AG Inc. v. Syngenta AG (In Re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig.), No. 14-MD2591-JWL, 2016 WL 2866166, at *6 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016) (holding that jurisdiction-viaregistration violates the Dormant Commerce Clause) (relying on Davis, 262 U.S. at 317).
61.
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.30 at 270–72 (5th
ed. 2006); Andrews, supra note 22, at 1073 (noting that jurisdiction based on registration to do
business “would face problems under the Dormant Commerce Clause”); Brilmeyer, supra note
52, at 29 (noting that jurisdiction-via-registration “may be unconstitutional” under the Dormant
Commerce Clause); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L.
REV. 529, 533–34 (1991) (considering whether the Due Process-based law of personal
jurisdiction might be better understood as an attempt to address “commerce clause-related
concerns about burdening and discriminating against outsiders who are not represented in the
state’s political process”); Rhodes, supra note 7, at 440 (noting that the issue of whether
jurisdiction-via-registration violates the Dormant Commerce Clause is “still unresolved”); T.
Griffin Vincent, Comment, Toward a Better Analysis for General Jurisdiction Based on Appointment of
Corporate Agents, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 461, 491–92 (1989) (arguing that personal jurisdiction based
on appointment of an agent will sometimes violate the Dormant Commerce Clause).
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This Part is divided into two sections, each applying one of the two major
strains of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis to personal jurisdiction.62
Section A argues that jurisdiction-via-registration, when imposed by a state
lacking any connection to the suit, impermissibly discriminates against
interstate commerce. Section B argues that, even if such jurisdiction is not
discriminatory, it nonetheless impermissibly burdens interstate commerce in
cases that lack any connection to the forum state.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
1. What is Unconstitutional Discrimination?
The Dormant Commerce Clause forbids a state from protecting local
economic actors from competition by out-of-state economic actors, usually by
imposing extra costs or burdens on out-of-state actors.63 Laws imposing these
unconstitutional costs or burdens can be either facially discriminatory or
facially neutral with discriminatory effects.
A straightforward example of facial discrimination can be found in in
Granholm v. Heald, a case involving the sale of wine.64 In New York and
Michigan, producers of wine sold it to wholesalers, who then sold it to
retailers, who then sold it to consumers. Both states, however, made an
exception for in-state wineries by allowing them to sell directly to consumers.65
While consumers could tour New York or Michigan wineries, taste a wine, and
buy a couple cases of it, a winery from Pennsylvania would be forced to sell its
wine through the less lucrative wholesaler–retailer channel. The Supreme
Court held that the state laws establishing this approach were “discrimination
against interstate commerce.”66 Since the legislation favored New York and
Michigan wineries over Pennsylvania wineries, it prevented Pennsylvania
wineries from competing on an equal footing with New York wineries in New
York and Michigan wineries in Michigan. The only way to compete on an
equal footing would be to relocate within New York or Michigan—a result that
“runs contrary to [the] admonition that States cannot require an out-of-state
firm ‘to become a resident in order to compete on equal terms.’”67

62.
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“[O]ur case law
yields two lines of analysis: first, whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce; and
second, whether the ordinance imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.” (citations omitted)).
63.
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (“The paradigmatic
example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or
customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar
products produced in State.”).
64.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005).
65.
Id. at 469–70.
66.
Id. at 467.
67.
Id. at 475 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72
(1963)).
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As in Granholm, the Supreme Court has detected unequal treatment in
laws that impose higher use fees on out-of-state truckers,68 laws that impose
higher taxes on dividends derived from out-of-state companies,69 and laws that
force consumers to purchase products and services from in-state businesses.70
In these situations and others like them,71 out-of-state companies find
themselves at a competitive disadvantage when competing for in-state
business, because in-state companies, having lower costs or built-in demand,
are able to undercut their out-of-state competition.
Even if a state law does not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce, it may nonetheless have a discriminatory effect. In Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, for example, the Supreme Court
struck down a facially neutral law that had the “practical effect” of
discriminating against out-of-state businesses.72 Hunt concerned a North
Carolina law aimed at preventing fraud in the labeling of apples. The law
required all apples sold in the state to be labeled with “no grade other than
the applicable U.S. grade or standard.”73 On its face, the law was
nondiscriminatory. In effect, however, the law “insidiously operate[d] to the
advantage of local apple producers.”74 Washington apple growers were
prohibited from labeling their fruit as “Washington apples”—a label of
apparent significance in the apple market.75 Additionally, the law raised the
costs to Washington apple producers because it forced them to label apples
headed to North Carolina separately—a cost not borne by North Carolina
producers.76
The year after Hunt, the Court narrowed its applicability in Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, where it upheld a Maryland law that barred petroleum
producers and refiners from owning retail gas stations in that state.77
Although this would harm only outsiders because “no petroleum products
[we]re produced or refined in Maryland,” the Court upheld the law because
retail gasoline stations in Maryland would still face substantial competition.78

68.
See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284–87, 296 (1987).
69.
See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 327 (1996).
70.
See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1994).
71.
See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994)
(holding that a state may not impose a higher cost of disposal on trash imported from another
state); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) (declaring invalid an Ohio
tax rebate for ethanol that favored Ohio ethanol producers); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982) (invalidating Nebraska regulations that forbade use of Nebraska water
outside the state of Nebraska).
72.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
73.
Id. at 339.
74.
Id. at 351.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
78.
Id. at 123.
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Even though producers and refiners could not sell gas to consumers in
Maryland, other entities could. Under Exxon, state laws that disadvantage out-ofstate companies will not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as long as
other out-of-state suppliers “will . . . ‘promptly replace[ ]’ the goods that
would have been sold by the companies that cease selling in state.”79
Even though some discriminatory laws—whether on their face or in
effect—would not actually dissuade companies from doing business in a state,
this is not relevant to the constitutionality of those laws. For example, if
California imposed a $1 tax on cars sold in the state by non-residents, it is
unlikely that out-of-state car sellers would give up on the lucrative California
market. However, the Supreme Court assumes that discriminatory laws will
have an effect on the flow of interstate commerce, even if the discriminatory
costs are relatively small.80 It is not hard to imagine why the Court might prefer
this approach. A million-dollar apple producer, with its low cost of
production, may see the North Carolina market as so lucrative that a
discriminatory tax will have no effect on its decision to sell apples in the state.
A smaller grower, with higher costs of production, may have an entirely
different view. Should the constitutionality of the state law depend on the
plaintiff’s balance sheet? And if so, what is the rate of return that a state may
not deprive an out-of-state business of? These questions are unanswerable—
at least by a court attempting to implement legal rules for an entire nation.
Accordingly, the Court has made it clear that there is no such thing as a “‘de
minimis’ defense to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce
Clause.”81 Out-of-staters are either treated equally or they are not, regardless
of whether or to what degree the unequal treatment actually discourages
them from doing business in the state.82

79.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 127).
80.
See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1996).
81.
Id.; see also Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (1994) (“[A]ctual
discrimination, wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the
discrimination have no bearing on the determinative question whether discrimination has
occurred.”); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981) (“We need not know how unequal
the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates.”).
82.
It appears that the Supreme Court’s “de minimis” rule is not always religiously applied
in the lower courts. In the recent case of Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, for example, the court
refused to strike down a state law that required bets at racetracks to be placed in person. Churchill
Downs Inc. v. Trout, 589 F. App’x 233 (5th Cir. 2014). Although the law “may result” in
discriminatory effects, the court observed, there was no “concrete record evidence” providing
that. Id. at 237. Even if some courts are not willing to presume discrimination in every case,
however, the Supreme Court (as we shall soon see) has already held that the burden of
jurisdiction-via-registration is far more than de minimis. In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises Inc., the Court declared that “[r]equiring a foreign corporation . . . to defend itself
with reference to all transactions, including those in which it did not have the minimum contacts
necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction, is a significant burden.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988) (emphasis added).
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Once the Court determines that a law discriminates against interstate
commerce, it must then determine whether the law “advances a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”83 If it does, then the law is constitutional; if
not, the law is void. Importantly, this test is a high hurdle to clear. It is so rarely
overcome, in fact, that the Court frequently refers to it as a “virtually per se rule
of invalidity.”84
The Supreme Court has never explicitly specified which state interests
are “legitimate” for the purposes of the Commerce Clause, but the cases do
provide some guidance. First, a state has a legitimate interest in the health
and safety of persons inside the state—whether they are residents or not.85
Second, a state has a legitimate interest in the integrity of its natural
resources.86 Third, a state has a legitimate interest in protecting the economic
health of its populace—provided that it does not pursue that interest at the
expense of out-of-state persons or businesses.87 Fourth and finally, a state does
not have a “legitimate interest in protecting nonresident[s]”—at least to the
degree they are injured out of state.88
If a discriminatory law concerns a legitimate state interest, the next
question is whether there is a non-discriminatory alternative for advancing the
interest. In almost all the cases addressing this issue, the Court has found the
state regulation unconstitutional because non-discriminatory alternatives
existed. For example, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court invalidated an
Oklahoma law barring people who caught minnows in Oklahoma from
shipping them out of state.89 Though discriminatory, Oklahoma argued the
discrimination was justified because it was attempting to conserve its minnow
population. The Supreme Court held that the justification was inadequate,
explaining that
[f]ar from choosing the least discriminatory alternative, Oklahoma
has chosen to conserve its minnows in the way that most overtly
discriminates against interstate commerce. The State places no limits
on the numbers of minnows that can be taken by licensed minnow
83.
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
84.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
85.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (stating that states have an
“unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people”).
86.
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (“[A] State’s power to
regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health
of its citizens—and not simply the health of its economy—is at the core of its police power.”).
87.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 106 (1994)
(“Our cases condemn as illegitimate, however, any governmental interest that is not ‘unrelated
to economic protectionism.’”).
88.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (holding that while “protecting local
investors [i.e., Illinois citizens] is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no legitimate
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders”).
89.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323 (1979).
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dealers; nor does it limit in any way how these minnows may be
disposed of within the state.90
In other words, Oklahoma could have enacted a non-discriminatory
alternative by simply limiting the minnow harvest within the state, regardless
of who harvests the minnows or where they are ultimately sold.91
One case in which the Court has found a discriminatory law to be justified
is Maine v. Taylor—a case involving Maine’s prohibition against importing
certain baitfish into the state.92 Though the discriminatory nature of the
Oklahoma and Maine statutes was nearly identical, Maine was able to proffer
a sufficient justification.93 The goal of Maine’s law was to protect its “unique
and fragile fisheries” from parasites or non-native species, both of which were
often found in shipments of baitfish into the state.94 The Supreme Court
found this justification sufficient, for the evidence showed that Maine had “no
satisfactory way” to protect against these threats—other than banning the
importation of baitfish.95
2. Jurisdiction-via-Registration Is Unconstitutionally Discriminatory
Given the law explained above, jurisdiction-via-registration statutes
cannot pass muster, at least when they are used to assert jurisdiction over a
non-domiciled defendant who is injured out of state. This conclusion follows
from the analysis of two questions: first, is jurisdiction in these cases
discriminatory and, second, if it is, then is the discrimination justified by a
legitimate state interest that cannot be served in a non-discriminatory
manner.
First, jurisdiction-via-registration laws do not facially discriminate against
out-of-staters. They generally apply to all companies that desire to do business
in the state, regardless of whether the companies also claim that state as their
home.96 However, these laws do have the “practical effect” of discriminating
against out-of-state companies.97
To see the effect, consider a hypothetical in which two companies, Illinois
Inc. (headquartered and incorporated in Illinois) and Florida Inc.
90.
Id. at 337–38.
91.
Id. at 338. For other cases finding that the state lacked a legitimate non-discriminatory
response, see Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956, 958 (1982);
and Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
92.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
93.
Id. at 132.
94.
Id. at 140–41.
95.
Id. at 141.
96.
See Benish, supra note 7, at 1647–61 (collecting registration statutes). Even if registration
laws do not apply to residents and non-residents alike, states could easily re-write them in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, there is little reason to consider whether the statutes discriminate on
their face. The more important consideration is whether they discriminate in effect.
97.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
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(headquartered and incorporated in Florida), are in the business of selling
furniture. Both companies would like to expand into the other’s home state,
but Illinois requires all companies doing business in the state to consent to
suit in the state—regardless of whether the suit arises from their business in
that state. Florida does not have such a requirement. On these facts, Illinois
Inc. would be marginally more likely to enter the Florida market than Florida
Inc. would be to enter the Illinois market, because Florida Inc. would be
subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida and Illinois for all suits arising
throughout the world. By contrast, Illinois Inc. would be subject to personal
jurisdiction only in Illinois for all suits arising throughout the world if it did
business in Florida.
Why would Florida Inc.’s susceptibility to general jurisdiction in Illinois
discourage it from doing business in Illinois? There are many reasons,
including Illinois’ rules of procedure, local practices, and choice-of-law rules.
Illinois might have procedural rules that make jury trials far more likely, or
punitive damages rules that make product liability suits especially risky. These
matters are covered in greater detail in the following Part,98 but for now, it
will suffice to note that the Supreme Court’s admonition (also covered in the
following Part) in Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enterprises—a case discussing the
intersection between personal jurisdiction and the Dormant Commerce
Clause—that “[r]equiring a foreign corporation . . . to defend itself with
reference to all transactions, including those in which it did not have
minimum contacts necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction, is a
significant burden.”99
Notwithstanding this explanation, it is tempting to conclude that
jurisdiction-via-registration merely equalizes the jurisdictional burdens of instate and out-of-state companies. In-state companies, by virtue of their
residency, are already subject to general jurisdiction in the state. So out-ofstate businesses, when subjected to general jurisdiction based only on
registration, are not treated worse than in-state companies; they are treated
exactly the same. This line of argument misses the fact that laws can violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause even where in-state and out-of-state businesses
are treated the same.100 Recall that in Hunt, North Carolina’s unconstitutional
labeling law applied to all apple producers, in-state and out-of-state alike. The
law was nonetheless discriminatory because it “insidiously operate[d] to the

98.
See generally infra Part III.B.
99.
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988).
100.
See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (“The
ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the
prohibition.”); Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 214
(3d Cir. 2002) (noting that Carbone “explicitly rejected the argument that a disputed statute
would have to favor all in-state businesses as a group—a statute may be invalid if it favors only a
single or finite set of businesses” (quoting Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d
788, 798 (3d Cir. 1995))).
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advantage of local apple producers.”101 That is, the law took an advantage that
out-of-staters possessed (the “Washington apple” label) and nullified its
benefit within the state. In the personal jurisdiction context, out-of-state
companies also have an advantage over in-state companies—the ability to
avoid suits in the state that are unrelated to its activities there. As in Hunt,
subjecting registrants to personal jurisdiction strips this advantage and thus
potentially protects locals from competition.102 And unlike in Exxon, there are
no “out-of-state suppliers [that] ‘will . . . promptly replace[ ]’ the goods that
would have been sold by the companies that cease selling in state.”103 That is,
because jurisdiction-via-registration laws operate against all out-of-state
businesses, there is no reason to think that another business (e.g., Alabama
Inc., Nebraska Inc., etc.) will step into the market that Florida Inc. has
vacated.104
Given its discriminatory nature, a jurisdiction-via-registration law should
survive only if “it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”105 Whether
a state has a legitimate interest in extracting consent from businesses, depends
on the situations in which the state wishes to extract consent. Consider the
following six hypothetical lawsuits that a plaintiff might file in Illinois106 and
the likely bases for personal jurisdiction:
Plaintiff 1 is an Illinois resident injured in Illinois by the defendant’s
purposeful conduct in the state. The plaintiff can sue in Illinois based on the
defendant’s purposeful activity in the state.107

101.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351.
102.
Id.
103.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978)).
104.
It might also be argued that, to the extent that jurisdiction-via-registration forces
companies to litigation disputes away from their home state or state where the cause of action
arose, the doctrines of transfer and forum non conveniens (“FNC”) can be invoked to alleviate
those burdens. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (authorizing federal courts to transfer where plaintiff
filed suit in an inconvenient forum); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Forum Non Conveniens
Doctrine in State Court as Affected by Availability of Alternative Forum, 57 A.L.R. 4th 973 (1987)
(describing circumstances in which state courts will dismiss suit because it would be more
conveniently litigated elsewhere). There are two problems with this argument. First, transfer and
FNC motions cost money to litigate. These costs, whether large or small, would amount to at least
a de minimis burden, which is sufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 (1996). Second, there is no guarantee that such motions would
routinely be granted. Questions concerning the convenience of a forum are typically left to the
sound discretion of the trial judge. Even if transfer and FNC make the constitutional violation
less significant, they do not amelioriate the violation altogether.
105.
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
106.
The state of Illinois is used here simply for illustration purposes. There is nothing about
Illinois law or the state in general that affects the applicability of these examples to other states.
107.
See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding personal
jurisdiction exists where defendant has established contacts with the forum state giving rise to the
claim alleged).
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Plaintiff 2 is an Illinois resident injured in Illinois by the defendant’s
conduct that has no relation to Illinois. The plaintiff can sue in Illinois only if
the defendant is domiciled in Illinois or has consented to be sued there.108
Plaintiff 3 is an Illinois resident injured outside Illinois by the defendant’s
conduct that has no relation to Illinois. The plaintiff can sue in Illinois only if
the defendant is domiciled in Illinois or has consented to be sued there.109
Plaintiff 4 is a non-resident of Illinois injured in Illinois by the
defendant’s purposeful conduct in the state. The plaintiff can sue in Illinois
based on the defendant’s purposeful activity in the state. 110
Plaintiff 5 is a non-resident of Illinois injured in Illinois by the
defendant’s conduct that has no relation to Illinois. The plaintiff can sue in
Illinois only if the defendant is domiciled in Illinois or has consented to be
sued there.111
Plaintiff 6 is a non-resident of Illinois injured outside Illinois. The
plaintiff can sue in Illinois only if the defendant is domiciled in Illinois or has
consented to be sued there.112
Of the six different plaintiffs, Plaintiffs 1 and 4 will have no use for
consent arguments. Those plaintiffs will be able to sue in Illinois using the
state’s long-arm statute (which comports with the Due Process Clause under
International Shoe).113 The question is whether, with regard to suits brought by
Plaintiffs 2, 3, 5 and 6, Illinois has a legitimate interest in subjecting
defendants to personal jurisdiction based on consent by registration.
The state has no interest in extracting consent in a suit brought by
Plaintiff 6. Plaintiff 6 is a non-resident of Illinois injured outside Illinois, and
it is clear a state has no legitimate interest in protecting non-residents injured
out of state.114
That leaves Plaintiff’s 2, 3, and 5. As to Plaintiff 2, Illinois does have a
legitimate local purpose to subject the defendant to jurisdiction. The Plaintiff
is an Illinois resident injured in Illinois and the Supreme Court has frequently
held that states have a “manifest interest in providing effective means of

108.
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)
(holding that personal jurisdiction exists where defendant consents); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 462 (1940) (holding that personal jurisdiction exists where defendant is a domicile of the
forum state).
109.
Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703–04; Millikin, 311 U.S. at 462–64.
110.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321.
111.
Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703–04; Millikin, 311 U.S. 462–64.
112.
Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703–04; Millikin, 311 U.S. 462–64.
113.
As discussed in Part III, jurisdiction of this sort also comports with the Dormant
Commerce Clause. See infra notes 193–91 and accompanying text. This Part only considers the
constitutionality of consent under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
114.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644, (1982) (“While protecting local investors
[(i.e., Illinois citizens)] is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no legitimate interest
in protecting nonresident shareholders.”).
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redress for [their] residents.”115 Indeed, it is widely accepted that providing a
forum for the “protection for the legal rights of its citizenry” is “[o]ne of the
most basic duties of any sovereign.”116 Given its legitimate interest with regard
to Plaintiff 2, Illinois also has a legitimate interest with regard to Plaintiff 3.
Plaintiff 3 is a citizen of Illinois regardless of whether he is inside or outside
the state when he is injured.
Finally, Illinois also has an interest in protecting Plaintiff 5—the nonresident of Illinois injured in Illinois by the defendant’s conduct that has no
relation to Illinois. To make Plaintiff 5 more concrete, assume that she is Kay
Robinson, the owner of a Volkswagen purchased from Seaway Volkswagen,
Inc. in New York State. She is injured in an accident while passing through
Illinois and wishes to sue Seaway there—in other words, the same fact pattern
presented in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.117 She knows that
personal jurisdiction based on Seaway’s contacts with the state will be
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and is thus relieved to find
out that Seaway has registered to do business in the state. Seizing on this
registration, Mrs. Robinson argues that Seaway is subject to jurisdiction in the
state because it has consented by registering. Seaway responds by arguing that
personal jurisdiction, if based on its registration alone, would violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. A state has a legitimate interest in the resolution
of disputes that arise in its state. Unlike in the Due Process context, it is

115.
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
116.
See Earl M. Maltz, Sovereign Authority, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the
Doctrine of Transient Jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 687–88 (1988); Russell J. Weintraub, Due
Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 524
(1984) (“Typically, the forum’s interest will be triggered by the plaintiff’s residence in that
forum.”); see also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (noting that a state
has “unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people”). A footnote in the recent
case Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown might seem to point in the opposite direction.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). There, the court noted
that “[g]eneral jurisdiction to adjudicate has in [United States] practice never been based on the
plaintiff’s relationship to the forum.” Id. at 929 n.5 (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1137 (1966)).
This may be true with regard to the issue in Goodyear, which was jurisdiction based on extensive
business contacts comported with the Due Process Clause. Just because the plaintiff’s residence
in the forum state may not be used to augment the case for doing-business jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause, however, does not mean that the plaintiff’s residence is automatically
irrelevant to a Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry involving consent to jurisdiction. A state’s
interest in its residents may be sufficient to justify its actions in some contexts but not others. See
Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 894 (1988). Nor does this footnote imply that
personal jurisdiction in a case involving Plaintiff 4 would violate the Due Process Clause. Goodyear,
as noted above, involved doing business jurisdiction and was unconcerned with consent. The
Court has unequivocally declared that the Due Process Clause is not violated when a defendant
consents to personal jurisdiction—regardless of whether the plaintiff is a state resident or not. See
generally Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). This Article does not
challenge the validity of consent as a matter of Due Process; it argues that personal jurisdiction
based on consent through registration to do business violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
117.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288–89 (1980).
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immaterial to the Dormant Commerce Clause whether the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum state. Lack of
purposeful availment may defeat personal jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts, but it does not defeat jurisdiction based on consent. Where a
plaintiff suffers an injury inside its borders, a state has an interest in seeing
that the injury is redressed because failure to do so reflects poorly on the state
and may render it less attractive to business. Using World-Wide Volkswagen as
an example, Professor Wendy Perdue has made the point this way:
[A] state would seem also to have a legitimate interest in providing
a forum whenever it is the place of injury. Injuries have ramifications
beyond the people immediately affected. In World-Wide Volkswagen,
for example, the plaintiff’s car blew up on an Oklahoma road. Such
an accident may well threaten the safety of passers-by and rescue
workers as well as interfere with traffic. Local residents have a
legitimate interest in knowing the cause of such an accident and
likewise have an interest in providing a forum for disputes arising
out of the accident.118
Given that states have a legitimate interest in providing a forum for
redress to residents injured in and out of state (Plaintiffs 2 and 3) and nonresidents injured in state (Plaintiff 5), the second part of the Dormant
Commerce Clause test inquires whether that interest could “served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”119 In the context of jurisdictionvia-registration, the only way that a state can effectuate its interest is to extract
consent from the defendant somehow. A state could, of course, simply declare
that companies who injure residents outside the state or non-residents in the
state will be subject to personal jurisdiction in the state, but this law would be
violate the Due Process Clause.120 Therefore, the only option available to the
state that comports with due process is to extract consent from the company
with a registration law.
In sum, state laws that subject companies doing business in the state to
general jurisdiction will sometimes have discriminatory effects on interstate
commerce. Such effects will nonetheless be tolerable when the plaintiff is a
state resident (whether injured in or out of state) or a non-resident injured in
state. However, where the plaintiff is a non-resident injured out of state, the
state has no legitimate interest in protecting him, so jurisdiction-viaregistration would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.

118.
Perdue, supra note 61, at 568 (footnotes omitted).
119.
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
120.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286. See generally Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct.
1115 (2014).
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B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BURDENSOME
1. What is an Unconstitutional Burden?
Even if a state law is not unconstitutionally discriminatory, it might still
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes on interstate commerce
a burden that is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”121
Courts assess the relative burdens and benefits under the “Pike balancing test,”
first articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.122 Compared to the discrimination
test discussed above, the Pike balancing test is much easier to overcome. As
explained below, a state needs only to show that its non-discriminatory law,
though potentially an impediment to commerce, delivers up a material
benefit (even if relatively small) to the state.
Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines is a good example of this principle. Bibb
concerned a facially neutral Illinois law that required trucks operating in the
state be equipped with “contour mudguards” on the rear wheels.123 Its effect
placed a burden on interstate commerce because truckers would have to stop
at the Illinois border, replace their trucks’ regular mudguards with contoured
mudguards, and then stop again to replace the original mudguards after
leaving the state.124 This was clearly a “burden on interstate commerce,” but
the burden alone was not fatal to the law.125 “[S]tate legislatures plainly have
great leeway,” the Court noted, “in providing safety regulations for all
vehicles—interstate as well as local.”126 Many of these regulations will affect
the flow of commerce through the state—speed limits and other traffic
restrictions being the most obvious. Most of these laws will nonetheless be
justified because they deliver a benefit to the state that outweighs the burden.
Illinois’ mudguard requirement, however, did not deliver any apparent
benefit. The Court noted that the “contour mud flap possesses no advantages
over the conventional or straight mud flap [and, in fact,] creates hazards
previously unknown to those using the highways.”127 While states have “great
leeway” to enact laws burdening commerce, the laws must offer up at least
some plausible benefit.128 Other cases reiterate the same rule applied in Bibb:
where a state cannot show any local benefit, the state law violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause.129

121.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
122.
Id.
123. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524–25 (1959).
124.
Id. at 521.
125.
Id. at 527–28.
126.
Id. at 530.
127.
Id. at 525 (quoting Navajo Freight Lines v. Bibbs, 159 F. Supp. 385, 388 (S.D. Ill.
1958)).
128.
Id. at 530.
129.
See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp, 450 U.S. 662, 672 (1981) (rejecting a state
limitation on twin trailers because the “evidence clearly establishes that the twin is as safe as the
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To the same point, other cases demonstrate that, when a state can show
some benefit, the Court will uphold the law without truly balancing the
burden against the benefit because it is either unable or unwilling to perform
such an analysis.130 Who can say, for example, that a state’s environmental
interest in reducing the use of plastic containers truly “outweighs” the burden
on out-of-state milk producers who sell milk in the state using plastic
containers?131 To balance these two matters against each other is akin to
“judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”132
For this reason, courts tend to approve state laws that burden commerce as
long as the law plausibly advances any legitimate state interest, even if the
interest is slight. It is only where a law is unsupported by any plausible state
interest that courts declare it unconstitutional.133 While courts are largely
unable to measure the size of a state benefit, they are able to see where a
benefit is utterly absent.134

[single trailer]”); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 (1978) (invalidating
a state highway law because of a “massive array of evidence . . . disprov[ing] the State’s assertion
that the regulations make some contribution to highway safety”); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 777 (1945) (invalidating an Arizona law limiting train lengths in part because the
law does not improve safety but “tends to increase the number of accidents”); see also DENNING,
supra note 11, § 6.05 (“If a measure imposes significant costs, but no real benefits, or the benefits
prove to be illusory, courts will invalidate them under Pike. In some cases, the lack of appreciable
benefits raises suspicion that some invidious purpose is lurking behind the statute.”).
130.
See Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (observing, in a case involving the
market for municipal bonds, that the “Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited” to resolve the
econometric questions that the Pike test demands an answer to).
131.
See generally Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
132.
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
133.
See, e.g., Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d 904, 914 (7th Cir. 2003) (“This makes
any balancing under Pike fairly effortless: no legitimate local interest has been presented to justify
the burden [state law] has on interstate commerce.”); R & M Oil & Supply, Inc. v. Saunders, 307
F.3d 731, 735–76 (8th Cir. 2002) (invalidating state law because “the local benefit actually
derived from the statute is minimal or nonexistent”); Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1294
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (approving state law subject to Pike challenge in part because “law promotes
compliance with fire and accessibility codes, helps reduce indoor pollution, and protects
consumers from incompetent interior designers”), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011); Martin
Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Greenwood, No. 06-697-CV-W-W, 2008 WL 4832638, at *6 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 4, 2008) (rejecting state law pertaining to truck traffic because city “was unable to produce
any evidence of safety issues related to truck traffic”); Sitco, Inc. v. Agco Corp., No. CV–05–073–
E–BLW, 2005 WL 3244261, at *5 (D. Idaho Oct. 25, 2005) (finding “no evidence . . . that the
[state] statute creates a substantial burden on interstate commerce” but noting that “[e]ven if
such a burden exists, the statute does provide the significant local benefit of protecting dealers
from unfair supplier practices”).
134.
In this sense, the Pike balancing test appears similar to a substantive due process rational
basis test. See Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven in the
absence of discrimination, a burden on interstate commerce that had no rational justification
would be invalid.”); DENNING, supra note 11, § 6.05 (“Dormant Commerce Clause challenges
sometimes cloak what are, at bottom, economic substantive due process challenges.”).
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This approach to balancing can be seen in Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enterprises, a case that lies at the intersection of personal jurisdiction
and the Dormant Commerce Clause.135 Bendix (a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Ohio) hired Midwesco (an Illinois
corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois) to install a boiler
in Bendix’s Ohio factory. Bendix became dissatisfied with the boiler and, six
years after the installation, sued Midwesco for breach of contract.136 Midwesco
defended itself by arguing that the four-year statute of limitations had run.
Bendix responded by citing an Ohio statute that tolled the statute of
limitations for any period in which the defendant company did not maintain
an agent in the state to receive service of process.137 Bendix argued that
because Midwesco did not have an agent in the state to receive process for at
least two of the previous six years, the four-year time limit had not yet
expired.138 Midwesco responded by arguing that the Ohio statute violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause.139
The Court held that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional. Although the
Court suggested that the statute was probably unconstitutionally
discriminatory,140 the Court elected to apply the Pike balancing test. The Court
explained that “the burden the tolling statute places on interstate commerce
is significant.”141 The key to the burden is that the Ohio statute offered
companies a Hobson’s choice. On one hand, a company could appoint an
agent to receive process in the state in return for a definite statute of
limitations. A downside of this approach, however, is that the company would
be subject in Ohio to any suit by any plaintiff on any matter for as long as the
agent was appointed. As the Court put it, “requiring a foreign corporation to
appoint an agent for service in all cases and to defend itself with reference to
all transactions, including those in which it did not have minimum contacts
necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction, is a significant burden.”142 On
the other hand, a company could escape this wide-ranging jurisdiction by
refusing to appoint an agent. Yet doing so would require the company to
forfeit its statute-of-limitations defense. By attempting to escape one
“significant burden,” the company would fall prey to another one. However,
in-state companies do not face this Hobson’s choice: as domiciliaries of the

135.
Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 889.
136.
Id. at 889–90.
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at 890.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 891 (“The Ohio statute before us might have been held to be a discrimination
that invalidates without extended inquiry. We choose, however, to assess the interests of the State,
to demonstrate that its legitimate sphere of regulation is not much advanced by the statute while
interstate commerce is subject to substantial restraints.”).
141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 892.
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state, they are already subject to jurisdiction for any and all suits, and because
they are always amenable to service of process, they may take advantage of
ordinary limitations periods without any cost.143
A law’s burdensomeness on its own, however, is not enough to render a
law unconstitutional. If the law provides a plausible benefit to the state, the
law will pass the Pike balancing test. In Bendix, however, the Court was unable
to find any local benefit.144 The first purported benefit was the state’s interest
in assisting plaintiffs with serving process on foreign companies, a task
presumably made much easier if the company had an agent in the state.145
With little explanation, the Court simply concluded that this benefit was
illusory or at least insignificant.146 The second purported benefit was the
protection of Ohio “residents from corporations who become liable for acts
done within the state but later withdraw from the jurisdiction.”147 Protecting
residents from this problem obviously benefits the state, but the Court held
that the statute was unnecessary to secure that benefit.148 Ohioans injured instate could make use of the “the Ohio long-arm statute,” which allowed them
to bring companies back into Ohio to stand trial.149 Because the statute would
impose a “significant burden” in cases “in which Ohio had no interest,” the
Court held that the statute must “fall under the Commerce Clause.”150
Bendix illustrates how the burden/benefit analysis applies in the context
of state judicial power. As in Bibb and similar cases, state burdens on
commerce are most at risk where the state is unable to show any legitimate
benefit that the law delivers to the state. Where the state can show a plausible
interest, the courts will typically uphold the law.
2. Jurisdiction-via-Registration Is Unconstitutionally Burdensome
Under Bendix and the other cases discussed above, jurisdiction-viaregistration will be unconstitutional in suits brought by non-residents injured
out of state. In those cases, the local benefit is completely absent and the
burden on interstate commerce will be “clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”151 In cases where the plaintiff is a resident or was
injured in the state, however, a local benefit exists and jurisdiction-viaregistration will be constitutional.
The specific burdens and benefits of jurisdiction-via-registration are
discussed below. To an extent, however, it is immaterial what the exact nature
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 894.
Id.
Id. at 893–94.
Id.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 894–95.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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of the burden actually is, for the Supreme Court has already held that
“[r]equiring a foreign corporation . . . to defend itself with reference to all
transactions, including those in which it did not have the minimum contacts
necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction, is a significant burden.”152
Despite this declaration, it is nonetheless useful to explore what specifically
constitutes the burden that will discourage companies from doing business in
a particular state. The burdens are two-fold—choice-of-law rules and local
bias153—and the benefits involve protecting state citizens or enforcing state
law.
i.

Burden: Choice-of-Law Rules

Every state has its own set of laws and, because of that, defendants are
liable under a greater variety of laws when they are susceptible to suit in a
greater number of states. A company that is registered to do business in all 50
states would, if those states all had jurisdiction-via-registration rules, be subject
to a massive variety of laws. Some of these laws will be unfavorable to the
defendant. When unfavorable laws are invoked in a suit that is based only on
jurisdiction-via-registration, and more favorable laws would otherwise have
been applicable, this is a burden on the defendant because it increases the
defendant’s risk of an unfavorable judgment.
To understand how this burden arises, it is necessary to explore how
states decide which laws to apply in a particular case. Each state has a set of
“choice-of-law” rules—rules that instruct its courts on which laws should apply
in a given case.
Choice-of-law rules are complex and varied, but they do share some
universal features. First, every state’s choice-of-law rules will instruct its courts
to apply the procedural law of that state. Procedure, of course, is neither
neutral nor uniform across the country. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs prefer the
forum that provides the most advantageous procedure.
It is important to note here that, in the choice-of-law arena, procedure
includes a vast array of laws. At the core, state procedural laws are codified in
each state’s “Rules of Civil Procedure” and “Rules of Evidence.” These codes
(and their associated jurisprudence) contain a trove of laws worth shopping

152.
Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 893.
153.
Traditionally, courts have considered a third burden: inconvenience. With advances in
technology, however, inconvenience is deemed less important, and this Article thus ignores the
potential burden on inconvenience. See Klerman, supra note 7, at 250 (“While it is intuitive to
assume that it is significantly more expensive for a party to litigate out-of-state, this assumption is
not well-founded. There are no empirical studies documenting increased costs for out-of-state
litigants, and conversations with lawyers suggest that, in most situations, distance has little or no
impact on litigation costs.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1163, 1167 (2013) (“Today, litigation in a distant state is not a major inconvenience for
most corporate defendants.”).
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for, such as rules for qualification of expert witnesses,154 litigation of class
actions,155 and summary-judgment practice.156 Beyond these codes, however,
procedural laws in the choice-of-law arena also include statutes of
limitation,157 burdens of proof,158 and measures of damages,159 among
numerous other laws.160 All of these laws can make or break a case.
Second, every state’s choice-of-law rules instruct its court to apply the
substantive law of a particular state. Sometimes that law could be the state in
which the plaintiff has brought suit, but often it is not. For example, in tort
cases, some courts apply the substantive law of the state where the plaintiff was
injured.161 In contrast, other courts apply the substantive law of the state
having the “most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”162
To illustrate the operation of these two approaches, consider a case in
which a Virginia resident is injured in Montana while on a sightseeing tour
operated by a Virginia company. The plaintiff believes that her injury was
caused by the tour company, but the company believes that the plaintiff is at
least partially to blame because she was under the influence of alcohol when
she was injured. If the plaintiff were to file suit in Virginia, the court would
apply Montana law because Virginia courts apply the substantive law of the

154.
There are three or four different tests for the admissibility of expert evidences in use
across the states. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001).
155.
Many states employ class actions practices similar to those used in federal court, but
important differences exist. Class actions are nearly non-existent in Virginia and Mississippi, and
are very difficult to bring in Nebraska. For an explanation of these and other differences, see
generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from—
and Lessons for?—Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 147 (2007).
156.
In Virginia, for example, a motion for summary judgment may not be supported by
deposition testimony. VA. CODE § 8.01-420 (2015). Because defendants bring the great majority
of summary-judgment motions, this rule tends to favor plaintiffs.
157.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(1) (1971) (“An action will not be
maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, including a provision
borrowing the statute of limitations of another state.”); WEINTRAUB, supra note 61, § 3.2C2
(“Statutes of limitations have traditionally been classified as ‘procedural’ for conflicts purposes.”).
158.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 157, § 133 cmt. b (“Most rules
relating to which party has the burden of persuasion are concerned primarily with questions of trial
administration. When rules of this sort are involved, the forum will apply its own local law.”).
159.
Id. § 171 cmt. f (“The forum will follow its own local practices in determining whether
the damages awarded by a jury are excessive.”).
160.
See, e.g., id. § 135 cmt. a (“Regarding rules for sufficiency of the evidence,]
[c]onsiderations of efficiency and convenience require that the question whether a party has
introduced sufficient evidence to warrant a finding in his favor should usually be governed by the
local law of the forum.”); § 139 cmt. d (“[Regarding privilege,] [t]he forum will admit evidence
that is not privileged under its local law but is privileged under the local law of the state which
has the most significant relationship with the communication, unless it finds that its local policy
favoring admission of the evidence is outweighed by countervailing considerations.”).
161.
See generally, e.g., Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988).
162.
See, e.g., Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 157, § 145).

A3_PREIS (DO NOT DELETE)

150

11/3/2016 5:48 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:121

place where the wrong occurred.163 If the plaintiff filed suit in Montana, the
court would likely apply Virginia law because Montana courts apply the
substantive law of the state having “the most significant relationship” to the
tortious conduct.164 This distinction is important because Virginia law
recognizes the defense of contributory negligence165 while Montana law does
not.166 By suing in Virginia, the plaintiff could avoid a defense that could very
likely defeat her suit.
Consider now how jurisdiction-via-registration expands the plaintiff’s
options. Suppose that Virginia, instead of applying the law of the state where
the harm occurred (i.e., Montana law) will apply the law of the state with the
most significant interest (i.e., Virginia law). The plaintiff would gain no
advantage by filing in either state because both Montana and Virginia will
apply Virginia law, which allows for the defense of contributory negligence. If
jurisdiction-via-registration exists, however, the plaintiff may not be restricted
to Montana and Virginia. If the tour company is registered to do business in
other states (and has thereby consented to jurisdiction there), the plaintiff
could choose to file in any of those states. If any of those states have a choiceof-law regime that instructs its courts to apply the law of state where the injury
occurred, the plaintiff would have the advantage.
Accordingly, a company registered to do business in ten states, by being
subject to suit in those states, will also be subject to ten different choice-of-law
regimes. These regimes offer plaintiffs an advantage that would not exist if
the defendant were only subject to jurisdiction in its states of residency and
the states with which it had minimum contacts. Therefore, a company
deciding whether to do business in a particular state will reasonably find
registration statutes unattractive. Such statutes confer distinct benefits on
plaintiffs and, correspondingly, distinct costs on registered companies.
ii.

Burden: Local Practice

Even if choice-of-law rules were uniform and provided no advantage to
plaintiffs, “local practice” could still benefit them. Local practice involves
anything and everything except the substantive and procedural law applied in
a suit, such as the identity of the judge, the composition of the jury, the pace
of pleading, discovery and trial, the court’s overall willingness to grant

163.
Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Va. 1993).
164.
Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis, 330 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 2014). Based on this
simple fact pattern, it is difficult to say for sure whether Montana would apply Virginia law because
Montana’s choice of law test balances numerous different factors. A more detailed example could
easily be written that would conclusively point to Virginia law, but for brevity’s sake, this short
example is used.
165. See Hoar v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 777, 787 (Va. 1998).
166.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–702 (West 2015); Giambra v. Kelsey, 162 P.3d 134, 145
(Mont. 2007).
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summary judgment, and all the other features of adjudication that differ
according to the forum.167
The Eastern District of Texas is a prominent example of the advantages
local practice. The Eastern District is the most popular district in the country
for patent infringement cases,168 but its popularity cannot stem from for a
choice-of-law advantage because patent law is uniform throughout the
nation.169 The advantage must drive from somewhere else. In their paper,
Forum Selling, Professors Daniel Klerman and Greg Reilly identify numerous
factors that make the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs.170
Plaintiffs in the Eastern District, for example, have an amazing amount of
control over which judge will be assigned to their case,171 and, lest the
defendant attempts to avoid an unfavorable judge with a transfer motion,
plaintiffs have a stronger-than-usual chance of resisting transfer.172 Plaintiffs
in the Eastern District can also get to a jury more often173 and more quickly174
than in most other districts. Further, the district employs rules making
discovery175 and party joinder176 easier—traits that tend to benefit plaintiffs in
patent cases.
The Eastern District of Texas is a good example how important local
practices can be, but it is by no means the only example. Jefferson County
Mississippi or perhaps Madison County, Illinois are so-called “magic
jurisdictions” for asbestos litigation—places where, during the asbestos

167.
To be sure, some of these features—like rules for jury and judge selection—might be
better classified as “law” (and thus be included in the preceding discussion), but the distinction
is of little practical importance. Whether classified as law or practice, the goal here is to explain
the ways in which a forum can be disadvantageous to a defendant.
168.
See generally Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L.
& TECH. 193 (2007).
169.
All patent appeals are resolved in a single circuit, the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a) (2012).
170.
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV 241, 250–70 (2016).
171.
Because of the way in which cases are assigned throughout the district, and the number
of judges that serve in particular divisions within the district, a plaintiff is able to have “at least a
50% (and often far closer to 100%) chance of having a particular judge” hear her suit. Id. at 255.
172.
Id. at 260–63.
173.
Id. at 251–54.
174.
Id. at 265–68. The Eastern District operates a “rocket docket.” Id. This is an advantage
to plaintiffs, who normally can only obtain what they want when the litigation concludes, and a
disadvantage to defendants who normally want to continue to use the patented subject matter of
the dispute for as long as possible. Id.
175.
Id. at 268 (noting that certain mandatory discovery rules will impose outsized costs on
defendants).
176.
Id. at 257 (noting that joinder rules permitted plaintiffs to sue unrelated defendants
and that the plaintiff’s “perceived a significant strategic advantage” in suing defendants in this
manner).
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litigation boom, “a large plaintiffs’ verdict was practically guaranteed.”177
Consider this description of magic jurisdictions by a plaintiff’s lawyer who
rode that litigation wave:
[T]he “magic jurisdiction” [is a] jurisdiction[] where the judiciary is
elected with verdict money. The trial lawyers have established
relationships with the judges that are elected; they’re State Court
judges; they’re popul[ists]. They’ve got large populations of voters
who are in on the deal, they’re getting their place in many cases. And
so, it’s a political force in their jurisdiction, and it’s almost
impossible to get a fair trial if you’re a defendant in some of these
places. The plaintiff lawyer walks in there and writes the number on
the blackboard, and the first juror meets the last one coming out the
door with that amount of money. Now a lot of times those get set
aside on appeal, like in Texas, for example. A lot of you folks have
succeeded in electing a very conservative Supreme Court, that
reverses a lot of these things, but in order to get there you got to find
it. It’s pretty tough to handle a hundred or five hundred milliondollar judgment; it ties up your credit, your company; stock gets a
hard hit; and so they’re forced into a settlement.
There are probably a dozen magic jurisdictions around the
country where this is really a dangerous thing. The cases are not won
in the courtroom. They’re won on the back roads long before the
case goes to trial. Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk in there
and win the case, so it doesn’t matter what the evidence or the law
is. The jury is going to come back with a large number and the judge
is going to let it go to the jury, often on punitive damages.178
It is clear that local practice, quite apart from the applicable law, makes
a forum attractive. Something as prosaic as a bond requirement during appeal
can confer huge benefits on a plaintiff.
Notwithstanding these examples, an empirical study of transfer in federal
court by Professors Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg provides
strong evidence that local practice significantly affects litigation outcomes.179
Federal transfer is the perfect phenomenon for studying the purported effects
177.
Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525,
550–51 (2007).
178.
Richard Scruggs, Remarks at “Asbestos for Lunch,” a Prudential Financial Research
Financial Services Group Conference (June 11, 2002), in Steven Hantler, Toward Greater Judicial
Leadership on Asbestos Litigation, CIV. JUST. F., April 2003, at 20–21, http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/cjf_41.pdf. For further commentary on “magic jurisdictions” by Richard
Scruggs, see Richard Scruggs et al., Tobacco Lawyers’ Roundtable: A Report from the Front Lines, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 545 (2001).
179.
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511–13 (1995).
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of local practice, because when a federal court transfers a case from one
district to another, the substantive and procedural law will almost always
remain the same.180 Therefore, transfer is an instance in which the effects of
the local practice are isolated from other forum-related matters. In their study
of the topic, Clermont and Eisenberg concluded that “[t]he win rate drops
from 57.97% when the case is not transferred to 29.26% when transfer is
granted.”181 The win rate, in other words, just about falls in half. In the
authors’ view, the decreased win rate is partially attributable to a “less
favorable set of local biases in the new forum.”182 The more “dominant
influence, however, is probably the shifted balance of inconveniences.”183
Because the plaintiff will find it less convenient to litigate in the new forum
and the defendant will find it more convenient, the plaintiff will typically fare
worse.
Whether established qualitatively or quantitatively, there is little doubt
that the choice of forum, independent of the applicable law, often affects the
outcome of a case. In the context of interstate commerce, the effect of local
practice means that companies will be less likely to do business in states with
pro-plaintiff forums—at least to the extent that those states extract consent to
general jurisdiction as a condition of doing business there. As a result,
companies who are already located in those states will enjoy some protection
from competition from outsiders.
iii.

Benefit: Providing a Forum for Residents or Persons Injured in the State

On the benefit side of the Pike balancing test is a state’s legitimate
interest in providing a forum for its residents (regardless of where they are
injured) and non-residents injured in the state.184 Although our focus here is
on “local benefits” rather than a “legitimate interest,” the two are one in the
same in this context. A state derives benefit from the authority to adjudicate
the rights of residents injured out of state and non-residents injured in
state.185 Conversely, that the state derives no legitimate benefit from
adjudicating the rights of nonresidents injured out of state.

180.
Regarding procedural law, because the transferred case remains in federal court,
federal procedure will continue to apply. Regarding substantive law in a diversity case, Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990), requires the transferee court to apply the same
substantive law that the transferor court would have applied. Regarding substantive law in a
federal question case, the transferee court will apply the law in its own circuit, not the law in the
transferor circuit. See, e.g., Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc. 536 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2008).
Thus, only in a tiny minority of cases (i.e., cases where the transferor and transferee circuits have
different law on federal questions relevant to the case) will involve a post-transfer change in
substantive law.
181.
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 1512.
182.
Id. at 1515.
183.
Id.
184.
See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text.
185.
See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text.
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The Balance of Burdens and Benefits

The Pike balancing tests requires courts to determine whether the
burdens are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”186 In
making this determination, it is important to remember that the Supreme
Court typically grants states “great leeway” in pursuing state welfare.187 Traffic
laws, for example, will undoubtedly affect the flow of traffic and, to some
extent, will affect the flow of interstate commerce. Such laws will almost always
be upheld because the courts are unable or unwilling to precisely measure
the burdens and benefits.188 It is only where a state law cannot possibly
advance a legitimate state interest that courts will declare a state law
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Given this, registration laws that subject defendants to general
jurisdiction in a state are constitutional to the degree that they deliver some
benefit to the state, such as protecting state residents injured anywhere and
non-residents injured in state. It does not exist, however, where the plaintiff
is a non-resident injured out of state. Where non-resident plaintiffs make use
of registration laws to establish personal jurisdiction for injuries sustained out
of state, courts should refuse to apply jurisdiction-via-registration laws because
they are unconstitutional. In sum, personal jurisdiction based on business
registration imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in
cases brought by non-residents injured out of state. Such laws produce no
discernible benefits for a state and impose at least some costs. Therefore,
courts should hold that they violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
IV.

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE APPLIED TO OTHER BASES FOR
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The preceding Part argued that personal jurisdiction based on business
registration will violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when the plaintiff is a
non-resident injured out of state. This Part considers whether other bases for
personal jurisdiction run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. While most
bases for personal jurisdiction comport with the Dormant Commerce Clause,
courts should hold that jurisdiction based on either extensive business
operations (to the extent any of it remains after Daimler) or service of process
(transient jurisdiction) is unconstitutional.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL
There are three grounds for personal jurisdiction that will survive analysis
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. They are jurisdiction based on
(1) domicile; (2) consent; and (3) contacts giving rise to a law suit.

186.
187.
188.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959).
See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
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1. Domicile
Personal jurisdiction is frequently grounded on the defendant’s status as
a domiciliary of the forum state. On its face, this basis for personal jurisdiction
is discriminatory: it defines jurisdiction according to where the defendant
lives. Defendants that are domiciles of the forum state are subject to
jurisdiction for any and all claims; most other defendants are subject to
jurisdiction in the state only for claims related to their contacts with the state.
Though these laws differentiate between residents and non-residents,
they are not discriminatory in a way that would violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Laws that violate the Dormant Commerce Clause favor
insiders at the expense of outsiders.189 Yet personal jurisdiction based on
domicile does not favor insiders at all; instead, it favors outsiders. In this sense,
personal jurisdiction based on domicile is like an income tax imposed on
residents. If a state decides to impose an exorbitant tax on its residents’
incomes, the tax will encourage residents to leave the state and non-residents
not to come. Taxes that apply only to residents, while discriminatory in a pure,
definitional sense, do not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Of course, just because personal jurisdiction based on residency is not
discriminatory, it might still be unconstitutional if it imposes excessive
burdens on interstate commerce. To survive this analysis, however, a state
need only show that subjecting residents to jurisdiction produces some
meaningful benefit for the state. A state plainly has an interest in adjudicating
the rights of its citizens, even if those citizens are defendants.190 It can ensure
that its citizens are not wrongfully held liable, and perhaps just as importantly,
ensure that its citizens are held accountable for their tortious acts. Thus, there
is no Dormant Commerce Clause barrier to jurisdiction based on domicile.
2. Consent via Contract or Waiver
Although jurisdiction-via-registration—a form of jurisdiction by
consent—violates the Dormant Commerce Clause when a non-resident
plaintiff is injured out of state, jurisdiction-via-contract and jurisdiction-viawaiver are constitutional.
Consent via contract occurs when a defendant agrees, either before or
after a dispute has arisen, to subject itself to jurisdiction in a particular state.
Personal jurisdiction on this basis is perfectly constitutional under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. Unlike jurisdiction based on registration, where
the state extracts consent for the privilege of doing business, consent-viacontract is not extracted by the state, but by a private party. The state’s role is
simply to enforce the private agreement. As long as the state enforces such
agreements evenhandedly (i.e., without regard to the residency of the
defendant), then there is no discrimination in violation of the Dormant
189.
190.

See supra notes 63–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115–16.

A3_PREIS (DO NOT DELETE)

156

11/3/2016 5:48 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:121

Commerce Clause. Nor is there any burden imposed on interstate commerce.
A state’s willingness to enforce these contracts would not drive business or
other activity out of state or towards some other state—it simply invites
business into the state by offering benefits (dispute resolution services).
Consent-via-waiver occurs when a defendant, who may or may not have a
valid personal jurisdiction defense, fails to challenge personal jurisdiction in
the manner prescribed by the court. This ground for jurisdiction is
constitutional because it has no connection whatsoever to a non-resident
defendant’s decision to enter the forum state to do business. Consider a
plaintiff that wishes to sue an Illinois corporation in Oregon. The plaintiff is
well aware that the defendant has no contacts whatsoever with Oregon, but
hopes that the defendant will waive any jurisdictional objections. The fact that
this might occur would not affect the Illinois resident’s decision to enter
Oregon or not. By staying out of Oregon, the defendant does not insulate
itself from the possibility of jurisdiction-via-waiver, and by doing business in
the state, the company does not somehow increase its vulnerability to
jurisdiction-via-waiver. Because a corporation’s decision to do business in
Oregon is completely unaffected by waiver, jurisdiction-via-waiver does not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
3. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction is neither impermissibly discriminatory nor unduly
burdensome.191 One of the most common bases for personal jurisdiction,
“specific jurisdiction”192 exists when a lawsuit arises out of the defendant’s
purposefully established “minimum contacts” with the forum state.193 Specific
jurisdiction is in fact discriminatory, but not unconstitutional. Recall the
above example in the discussion of jurisdiction-via-registration.194 If Illinois
subjected corporate registrants to general jurisdiction but Florida did not, a
Florida company would be less likely to do business in Illinois than an Illinois
company could be likely to do in Florida. Put differently, Illinois companies
would be marginally more protected from foreign competition than Florida

191.
It should be noted that not all actions in a state that establish specific jurisdiction will
even trigger the Dormant Commerce Clause. An action must be sufficiently connected with
interstate commerce to come within the protections of the Clause. See infra note 208.
192.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–24 (2011)
(“Adjudicatory authority is ‘specific’ when the suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.’”).
193.
Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In addition to looking
for contacts that give rise to the claim alleged, courts additionally consider whether jurisdiction would
be consistent with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985) (“Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within
the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Int’l
Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320)).
194.
See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
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companies. The same analysis applies with regard to specific jurisdiction. If
Illinois maintains a specific jurisdiction statute but Florida does not, Illinois
residents would be marginally more likely to do business in Florida than
Florida residents would do in Illinois. Illinois businesses would thus be
protected from foreign competition, to some degree, by their state’s specific
jurisdiction statute.
However, just because personal jurisdiction statutes are discriminatory
does not mean they violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Discriminatory
laws are constitutional if they are justified by a legitimate state interest that
cannot be accomplished in a non-discriminatory manner.195 In this context, a
state’s interest in maintaining a specific jurisdiction statute is holding persons
accountable for harms suffered in the state based on their purposeful actions
directed at the state. Not only is this an interest that courts and scholars widely
consider legitimate, it is an interest that cannot be accomplished in a less
discriminatory way. Holding non-residents accountable for harms connected
with a particular state will always involve coercive action by that state, and
there is simply no other way for a state to achieve that interest.
Specific jurisdiction is also not unduly burdensome. Subjecting a person
to suit who commits a harm connected to a particular state likely discourages,
to some degree, persons from making contact with that state. Yet that burden
is easily overcome by the state’s interest in holding non-residents accountable
for wrongs connected with the state. Regardless of the fact that specific
jurisdiction is discriminatory and imposes a burden on interstate commerce,
it is constitutional because it delivers important benefits to a state.196
B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1. General Jurisdiction
Even though the Supreme Court dramatically curtailed general
jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, it is not entirely dead.197 Before Daimler,
large corporations doing business throughout the country could often be
sued in numerous states—regardless of where the cause of action arose. After
Daimler, these companies can, generally speaking, only be sued in their home
states or where the cause of action arose.198

195.
See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
196.
For the same reasons, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction will also comport with the
Dormant Commerce Clause. In rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction are based the presence of the
defendant’s property in the state and the suit must pertain the property itself. See generally 4A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070 (3d ed. 2002). Thus,
while these grounds for jurisdiction might dissuade persons from moving their assets into a particular
state or purchasing an interest in assets already located in a state, the state has a legitimate interest in
adjudicating the rights to the property in question and, because the property is located in the state, the
state has no other way to vindicate that interest except by taking jurisdiction.
197.
See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
198.
See supra notes 23–38 and accompanying text.
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However, the Daimler Court declined to “foreclose the possibility that in
an exceptional case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its
formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that
State.”199 An exceptional case, according to the Court, is Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.200 In Perkins, a plaintiff filed suit in Ohio against
Benguet, a company incorporated “under the laws of the Philippines, where
it operated gold and silver mines.”201 When Japan occupied the Philippines
during World War II, Benguet shut down its operations and its “president,
who was also the general manager and principal stockholder of the company,
returned to his home in Clermont County, Ohio[, where] he maintained an
office in which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on
behalf of the company.”202 Even though the lawsuit was unrelated to the
company’s activities in Ohio, the Court held that Ohio had personal
jurisdiction over the company because “Ohio was the corporation’s principal,
if temporary, place of business.”203
Given the odd facts of Perkins, it is hard to imagine other cases in which
the Court might find general jurisdiction appropriate. But under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, it is clear that a state may not subject a defendant
to jurisdiction for doing substantial business in a state unless the suit is
brought by a resident of that state or a person injured in the state. Prior to
Daimler, a company like Home Depot could be sued in California for any
claim, even though the company is headquartered in Georgia and
incorporated in Delaware. In contrast, a hardware retailer with the same
corporate residencies but with only a single, small store in California could
not be sued in the state for any claim. The difference between the two, of
course, is the amount of business conducted in the state. The pre-Daimler
approach to general jurisdiction essentially punished companies that dared
to do a large amount of business in a particular state. This is the exact type of
behavior that the Dormant Commerce Clause is designed to proscribe—the
imposition of extra costs on a foreign company that will compete with local
companies.
This conclusion is likely to elicit two responses. The first is that it requires
us to believe that general jurisdiction has been unconstitutional for just about
all of its history (as for the early case of Perkins, we will turn to that below).
Were all the lawyers and judges and (most) scholars simply asleep while doingbusiness jurisdiction developed and took hold? Perhaps. But simply because
an argument has been overlooked or even ignored does not make it wrong.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 447–48.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984) (describing Perkins).
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Indeed, the best evidence of this fallacy is Daimler itself. For decades, doingbusiness jurisdiction was a well-established aspect of personal jurisdiction law,
but on January 14, 2014, the Court suddenly held that it was unconstitutional.
Was the Supreme Court in Daimler wrong simply because it had waited too
long? Because it had allowed doing-business jurisdiction to become too
entrenched? Certainly not. Longstanding practices do not become
constitutional simply because they are longstanding. This is not to say that the
established nature of a rule is irrelevant to its likely constitutionality. Indeed,
it might well be appropriate to grant long-established rules a presumption of
constitutionality. But a presumption of constitutionality does not, on its own,
win the day. Any such presumption is overcome by the observation that
doing-business jurisdiction kicks in when a company dares to do serious
business in a state. That is a plain violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The second response is: what about Perkins? Daimler makes clear that
Perkins is still good law, but—if the analysis above is correct—might the Court
be required to overrule Perkins? Not necessarily. Although Perkins has long
been understood as a general jurisdiction case, it can easily be understood as
a case about corporate residency. Perkins was amenable to suit in Ohio not
necessarily because its contacts there were pervasive (they were not) but
because “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of
business.”204 The company’s operations in the Philippines had been
completely shut down, Ohio was the company’s only place of business. If a
case like Perkins arises again, the Court could approve jurisdiction in that
circumstance, while still holding general jurisdiction unconstitutional under
the Dormant Commerce Clause in cases brought by non-residents injured out
of state. The Court need only make clear that jurisdiction was based on the
fact that the company was subject to jurisdiction because its headquarters, at
the time, was located in the forum state.
2. Transient Jurisdiction
Transient jurisdiction—or personal jurisdiction based solely on service of
process while the defendant is present in the state—likely violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause in a narrow class of cases.205 Establishing personal
jurisdiction in this way simply involves delivering a court summons and copy
of the complaint to the defendant while the defendant is present in the forum
state.
Before explaining this analysis in greater detail, it is important to make
clear how narrow this class of cases actually is. To be unconstitutional, the case
must satisfy three separate criteria. First, jurisdiction must be sought over a

204.
Id. (describing Perkins).
205.
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990) (finding transient
jurisdiction to satisfy personal jurisdiction over a “nonresident, who was personally served with
process while temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated to his activities in the State”).
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defendant that is a natural person.206 Second, jurisdiction must be sought in
a case where both the plaintiff and defendant are non-residents of the forum
and the plaintiff was injured out of state.207 Third, jurisdiction must be
asserted in a case where the defendant’s presence in the forum state is
plausibly connected to interstate commerce, thus bringing the defendant
within the protections of the Dormant Commerce Clause.208 There will
certainly be some cases where all three of these criteria line up, but it is fair
to say that such cases will be extraordinarily rare.
In this narrow classes of cases, however, transient jurisdiction will be
unconstitutional because it discriminates against interstate commerce.209
Recall again the prior illustration showing how jurisdiction-via-registration
statutes are discriminatory. If Illinois required companies doing business in
the state to consent to general jurisdiction there, but Florida did not, an
Illinois company would be marginally more likely to expand into Florida than
a Florida company would be likely to expand into Illinois.210 If the parties are
natural persons instead of corporations (to accommodate the fact the
transient jurisdiction can only be asserted over human beings211), the
discriminatory nature of the jurisdiction remains. A Florida salesperson would

206.
Although the issue has never been conclusively resolved, transient jurisdiction is not
likely available against most corporate defendants and uncommonly available against other
entities. See supra note 22.
207.
In each of these three situations, any possible discrimination against or burden upon
interstate commerce will be overcome by the state interest in adjudicating the dispute. See supra
notes 105–20 and the accompanying text.
208.
Somewhat surprisingly, some state courts have held a defendant’s mere presence in a
state will not automatically implicate interstate commerce. See Knappenberger v.
Davis–Stanton, 351 P.3d 54, 64 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that, because defendant moved to
Oregon to live but not for employment, “there are insufficient circumstances implicating
interstate commerce to invoke the [Dormant] [C]ommerce [C]lause”); see also Pratali v. Gates, 5
Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 740 (Cal. 1992) (refusing to apply Dormant Commerce Clause, and stating
“[i]n any event, we question whether a single amicable loan between California acquaintances
while visiting in Las Vegas can rise to the level of interstate commerce within the meaning of the
commerce clause”). For further discussion of this point, see Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning,
301 F.3d 985, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2002).
209.
Given the discriminatory nature of transient jurisdiction in these cases, it is unnecessary
to consider the burden that jurisdiction might impose on interstate commerce. Nonetheless, it is
worth noting that whatever burden transient jurisdiction might impose, the burden will be far
less than the burden imposed by personal jurisdiction imposed by corporate registration. For
one, corporate registration is indefinite; it renders the company subject to personal jurisdiction
for the entire duration of the company’s registration—a period most likely measured in years.
For another, corporate registration is public; it can be discerned with a couple phone calls or a
brief internet search. In contrast, persons who travel to a new state do so only for short periods
of time. If they do so for longer, they would likely become a resident of the state. Additionally,
such travel (including the specific location of the defendant at any point in time) is usually
laborious to uncover. The burden on commerce imposed by business registration statutes will
typically far exceed that imposed by service of process on human defendants.
210.
See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text.
211.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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be marginally less likely to sell her wares in Illinois if she could be amenable
to suit under Illinois laws while she was there. Therefore, she would have to
share her Florida territory with Illinois salespersons, but Illinois salespersons
would need not share their territory with her.
The most compelling argument against this analysis comes from Burnham
v. Superior Court.212 In Burnham, the Supreme Court held that transient
jurisdiction did not violate the Due Process Clause. Although the focus of this
Article is on the Dormant Commerce Clause, the plurality’s reasoning in
Burnham is still powerful because it was based on the historical primacy of
transient jurisdiction. Citing American cases dating back to 1793 (and English
cases dating even further back), the Court explained that one of “the most
firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is
that the courts of a state have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically
present in the state.”213 This begs the question, if transient jurisdiction was so
“firmly established” that it could survive alongside modern Due Process
doctrine, why should it not also be firmly established enough to survive
alongside modern Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine? Or put differently,
if transient jurisdiction was permissible at the Founding, how could it be
impermissible now?
There are two responses to this point. First, even though all nine Justices
voted to uphold transient jurisdiction in Burnham, only four Justices
concluded that its historical foundations alone justified its retention.214 Thus,
Burnham does not hold that history is sufficient to justify transient jurisdiction
against the Due Process Clause. Second, the four-Justice plurality explicitly
acknowledged that transient jurisdiction might not have been firmly
established at the Founding.215 The plurality only posited that it was firmly
established “at the crucial time for present purposes: 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”216 There is credible evidence that
transient jurisdiction was not firmly established even at that point,217 but even
if it was, it would not resolve the Dormant Commerce Clause issue presented
212.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
213.
Id. at 610.
214.
Outside the four-Justice plurality (composed of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy and
White), four Justices (composed of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O’Connor),
concluded that “although . . . history is an important factor in establishing whether a
jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements,” it is not “the only factor.” Id. at 629. Justice
Stevens, writing alone, explained in a concurring opinion that the variety of reasons offered by
his colleagues “combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case.” Id. at 639.
215.
Id. at 611 (after quoting Justice Story’s endorsement of transient jurisdiction, noting
that “recent scholarship has suggested that English tradition was not as clear as Story thought”).
216.
Id.
217.
Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia’s Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial
Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 1004 (1992)
(regarding the cases cited by the Burnham plurality, stating that “it is not at all apparent that those
cases may collectively be read as categorically affirming transient jurisdiction in all situations,
especially when understood in historical context”).
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here. To resolve that issue, one must discern transient jurisdiction’s use in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—the era that would inform an
understanding of the Commerce Clause.
The historical question here depends not just on whether transient
jurisdiction, as a general matter, was widely used at the Founding, but instead
on whether transient jurisdiction when pursued by non-residents in a state
having no connection to the plaintiff’s injury is permissible. On this issue, the
evidence is far less clear, and it is not hard to imagine why. In an era where
travel and communication were slow and arduous, it would have been quite
rare that a plaintiff would leave his home state to chase down a defendant who
was also outside of his own home state.218
Not only would such assertions of jurisdiction, as a practical matter, be
rare, but scholarship suggests that their legal basis would have been dubious
as well. Transient jurisdiction is based, at its bottom, on a sovereign’s power
over persons within its territory. It is far from clear, however, that personal
jurisdiction at the Founding (whether in England or America) was a question
of sovereign power. In The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: the “Power”
Myth and Forum Conveniens, for example, Professor Albert Ehrenzweig
explored this issue and concluded that, from early England through at least
nineteenth century America, personal jurisdiction “depended upon voluntary
subjection of both parties” to the court’s authority, not on the court’s
unilateral authority over the parties.219 Service of process, in his account,
simply initiated a lawsuit; it did not amount to a type of “judicial arrest.” In a
separate study, Professor Geoffrey Hazard reached a similar conclusion.220
Hazard canvassed English cases involving service of process and concluded
that the cases are “reducible to the principal that personal service is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the exercise of jurisdiction.”221
Looking at early American cases, Professor Ehrenzweig similarly found
evidence of transient jurisdiction wanting. “[T]here is no indication in the
available case law,” he explained, “that [early American] courts were willing
or anxious to exercise ‘physical power’ in ‘transitory actions’ against a
nonresident on a foreign cause of action where the plaintiff was not a citizen
of the forum state and so was not entitled to special consideration.”222

218.
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956).
219.
Id. at 296. Professor Ehrenzweig explained that this conclusion “is supported on the one
hand by the fact that once submission has been obtained the law has always been satisfied with less than
actual power, and on the other hand by the law’s continuing desire for the defendant’s ‘co-operation’—
expressed, for instance, in its hesitation in admitting judgments by default.” Id.
220.
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 S. CT.
REV. 241 (1965).
221.
Id. at 256.
222.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 218, at 303.
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Professors Ehrenzweig and Hazard could be wrong, of course. But there
are two reasons to give their conclusion special weight. First, the plurality in
Burnham itself cited their work and admitted that it casts doubt on the
existence of transient jurisdiction at the Founding.223 Second, their
conclusions make sense as a matter of history. England, unlike America, was
not a nation of “competing, geographically limited jurisdictions.”224 It was a
single nation with single set of laws and there thus would have had no need
for a jurisdictional device designed to subject a defendant to suit one region
of the country instead of another.225 For this reason, it is not surprising to find
that,
until 1830, there was no developed English common law on what we
now call interstate or international jurisdiction. . . . [T]he attitude
toward territorial jurisdiction chiefly reflected two concerns, that the
English courts not get themselves in a position of entering an
unenforceable judgment and that the colonial courts not overreach
themselves.226
In sum, the available scholarship on English and Founding era
jurisdiction suggests that transient jurisdiction was invented well after the
Founding.
Without evidence establishing its Founding-era use, transient jurisdiction
should be held unconstitutional in the narrow category of cases defined
above. Of course, if evidence is uncovered suggesting that transient
jurisdiction of the sort at issue here was robust at the Founding, a
re-evaluation of this conclusion would be in order. Until then, however, such
jurisdiction should be considered invalid.
V.

CONCLUSION

Personal jurisdiction has long lived under the dominion of the Due
Process Clause, and for the most part, it should continue to reside there. But
personal jurisdiction is about more than fairness. It plays a major role in the
choice of forum—an enterprise driven by significant economic goals and with
significant economic consequences. Given this, courts should evaluate
personal jurisdiction under the Dormant Commerce Clause as well as the Due
Process Clause.
The recent case of Daimler AG v. Bauman and its resultant focus on
jurisdiction-via-registration make it perfect time to re-invigorate the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s role in personal jurisdiction. In doing so, courts should

223.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (“Recent scholarship has suggested
that English tradition was not as clear as Story thought.” (citing Hazard, supra note 220, at 253–60, and
Ehrenzweig, supra note 218, at 289)).
224.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 218, at 298.
225.
Id. at 297–98.
226.
Hazard, supra note 220, at 253.
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hold that jurisdiction based on (1) business registration, (2) extensive
business contacts, and (3) service of process, each violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause in cases brought by non-residents injured out of state.
Importantly, declaring jurisdiction unconstitutional in these circumstances
will leave most of personal jurisdiction law unchanged. The main effect of
applying the Dormant Commerce Clause in this field will simply be to
proscribe the boldest types of forum shopping—filing suit in a forum where
no party or event has a connection to the suit.

